In Anido v. Republic (G.R. No. 253527, 21 October 2024), Anido, a Filipino, married Enrique, a Peruvian Citizen, in New Jersey, USA. Later, they lived in Kentucky, USA, where Enrique obtained a divorce against Anido. In the Philippines, Anido sought recognition of said divorce decree. The Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss Anido’s Petition, finding that Anido failed to prove (1) that the divorce decree was granted in accordance with the laws of Kentucky; and (2) that as a result of the divorce judgment, Enrique was capacitated to remarry in accordance with the laws of Peru. The Supreme Court ruled that Anido only has to prove the pertinent marriage laws of Kentucky, the foreign state that issued the divorce decree in issue. While it may be argued that there is a need to prove the national law of the foreign spouse, since it needs to be established whether the same allows the divorce decree obtained to capacitate the foreign spouse to remarry, the Supreme Court gave the following reasons why only the laws of Kentucky, the foreign state that issued the divorce decree in issue, need to be issued. First, Article 26 (2) of the Family Code requires a divorce “validly obtained abroad” that capacitates the alien spouse to remarry, and for such language, the foreign law that must be proven by the applicant in a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree must be the law of the foreign country or state that issued the divorce decree. The foreign law of the country or state that issued the divorce decree is material because its court, office, or tribunal may grant a valid divorce decree only if it has obtained jurisdiction over the alien spouse and the subject matter of litigation, i.e., the marriage between the parties and its dissolution through divorce. Hence, to be granted relief under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, it must be shown that the dissolution of marriage by divorce “was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction” from which the divorce decree originated. Second, Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, is founded on the principle of comity of nations. Under the said principle, the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation may be recognized in the Philippines, such that the judicial records of a foreign court would have the same force in our country as in the place where the judgment was obtained. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, and the foreign court that issued the judgment is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. The goal of the principle of the comity of nations is to produce a friendly intercourse with the sovereignty that rendered the foreign decree or judgment.  Hence, the foreign law that must be proven by a party who seeks the recognition of a divorce decree or judgment must be the law of the country or state that issued it. The applicant must prove the law of the foreign court, office, or tribunal to show that it had competence or jurisdiction to issue the foreign decree or judgment, and that the latter is valid and binding in the country or state from which it originates. Third, the principle of comity of nations is not limited to decrees, judgments, or orders by a foreign court, office, or tribunal over its citizens, but also extends to other persons who are under the protection of the laws of the foreign state. A foreign decree, judgment, or order may be recognized in the Philippines even if the parties in the case are not citizens of the issuing state, provided that the parties are persons who are under the protection of the laws of the foreign state. A divorce decree may be issued by a court that has jurisdiction over the place where the parties have their domicile, even though the parties are citizens or nationals of another state. The principle is particularly true when it comes to a divorce decree issued by a state belonging to the USA, where jurisdiction over the subject matter in actions for divorce depends upon domicile, and without such domicile there would be no authority to decree a divorce. Fourth, the Court of Appeals ruled that Anido should have presented proof that under the laws of Peru, Enrique was allowed to remarry. However, by the wording of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, it is the divorce decree validly obtained abroad that must capacitate the alien spouse to remarry. The provision recognizes that even when a foreign court dissolves a marriage by way of divorce, it may prohibit remarriage based on the pertinent foreign statute. Consequently, in a petition for the recognition of a divorce decree, the petitioner must prove that the divorce decree itself or the applicable foreign law which granted the divorce allows remarriage. Fifth, even if the citizenship of Enrique was a material matter in the divorce between the spouses, the Kentucky Court would have taken into account the laws of Peru in relation to Kentucky’s rules as to conflict of laws. It follows that the decision of the Kentucky Court to grant the divorce decree in issue would be based on its own appreciation and interpretation of Kentucky’s rules on conflict of laws and its marriage statutes. Consequently, to look at the national law of Enrique and to apply it to the subject divorce decree would be tantamount to a relitigation or review of the merits of the foreign divorce decree, which cannot be done by the Supreme Court in a petition for the recognition of a foreign judgment. Certainly, in petitions for the recognition of a foreign judgment, as in the present case, the courts must adopt a policy of limited review and refrain from delving into the merits of the foreign judgment in question. The Philippine courts cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or

Under Section 2, Rule 130 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Court, documents as evidence consist of writings, recordings, photographs or any material containing letters, words, sounds, numbers, figures, symbols, or their equivalent, or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents. It was further clarified that photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray films, motion pictures or videos. A duplicate of an original document is defined as a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original under Section 4(b), Rule 130, Rule of Court. With the foregoing amendments, the question raised was whether a photocopied document remained secondary evidence, or may now be considered as a duplicate original, since it may be argued that it falls under the definition of being a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. Likewise, may a photograph of an original document be now considered as an original, since a photograph is a document, or at the very least, a duplicate original? In People v. Lastimosa,[1] the Supreme Court ruled that a photocopy is indeed a duplicate, admissible to the same extent as the original, unless: (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or (2) under the circumstances, it is shown that it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. The Supreme Court explained that Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines photocopy as a copy of usually printed material made with a process in which an image is formed by the action of light usually on an electrically charged surface. Meanwhile, Encyclopedia Britannica defines photocopying as the process of producing copies of original documents and drawings by exposing the originals to chemicals, light, heat, or electrostatic energy and recording the resulting images on a sensitized surface. The Supreme Court concluded that a photocopy, which is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original through action of light on an electrically charged surface, clearly falls under the definition of a duplicate. A photocopy, being a duplicate, is admissible to the same extent as the original absent any genuine question as to the authenticity of the original or a showing that it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Thus, photocopies, facsimile transmissions, scanned documents, and even photographs of documents may all be treated as duplicate originals. Notably, Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states, among others that when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. This now raises the question of when may a copy of document be considered as secondary evidence, or what would be the example of the same, since the foregoing reproductions, i.e., photocopies, facsimile transmissions, scanned documents, and photographs of documents, are considered as counterparts produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. In the absence of jurisprudence to provide for the same, it appears that copies of documents made through photographing, mechanical or electronic re-recording,  chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original may be deemed admissible. However, litigants should not fret for the admissibility of evidence does not equate to its probative value. Although the said copy may be considered admissible, its credibility and probative value still ultimately rests on the discretion of the court. [1]           G.R. No. 265758, 3 February 2025.

While notarization creates a presumption of regularity regarding the authenticity and proper execution of the contract, it does not alter the status of a void contract. The impugned documents cannot be presumed as valid because of the direct challenge posed thereto. Thus, a fictitious conveyance does not bind the parties despite its notarization. Similarly, a forged document is void, and will remain void even if it is notarized. Nevertheless, it bears stressing that even if the document or instrument is void, it may still be admissible in evidence, as long as it is relevant to the case, since there is no provision in the Rules of Court which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the rules for its admissibility. A void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself. (Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016; Chua v. Bank of Commerce, G.R. Nos. 263632 & 264110, 22 January 2025)