In Anido v. Republic (G.R. No. 253527, 21 October 2024), Anido, a Filipino, married Enrique, a Peruvian Citizen, in New Jersey, USA. Later, they lived in Kentucky, USA, where Enrique obtained a divorce against Anido.
In the Philippines, Anido sought recognition of said divorce decree. The Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss Anido’s Petition, finding that Anido failed to prove (1) that the divorce decree was granted in accordance with the laws of Kentucky; and (2) that as a result of the divorce judgment, Enrique was capacitated to remarry in accordance with the laws of Peru.
The Supreme Court ruled that Anido only has to prove the pertinent marriage laws of Kentucky, the foreign state that issued the divorce decree in issue. While it may be argued that there is a need to prove the national law of the foreign spouse, since it needs to be established whether the same allows the divorce decree obtained to capacitate the foreign spouse to remarry, the Supreme Court gave the following reasons why only the laws of Kentucky, the foreign state that issued the divorce decree in issue, need to be issued.
First, Article 26 (2) of the Family Code requires a divorce “validly obtained abroad” that capacitates the alien spouse to remarry, and for such language, the foreign law that must be proven by the applicant in a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree must be the law of the foreign country or state that issued the divorce decree. The foreign law of the country or state that issued the divorce decree is material because its court, office, or tribunal may grant a valid divorce decree only if it has obtained jurisdiction over the alien spouse and the subject matter of litigation, i.e., the marriage between the parties and its dissolution through divorce. Hence, to be granted relief under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, it must be shown that the dissolution of marriage by divorce “was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction” from which the divorce decree originated.
Second, Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, is founded on the principle of comity of nations. Under the said principle, the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation may be recognized in the Philippines, such that the judicial records of a foreign court would have the same force in our country as in the place where the judgment was obtained. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, and the foreign court that issued the judgment is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. The goal of the principle of the comity of nations is to produce a friendly intercourse with the sovereignty that rendered the foreign decree or judgment. Hence, the foreign law that must be proven by a party who seeks the recognition of a divorce decree or judgment must be the law of the country or state that issued it. The applicant must prove the law of the foreign court, office, or tribunal to show that it had competence or jurisdiction to issue the foreign decree or judgment, and that the latter is valid and binding in the country or state from which it originates.
Third, the principle of comity of nations is not limited to decrees, judgments, or orders by a foreign court, office, or tribunal over its citizens, but also extends to other persons who are under the protection of the laws of the foreign state. A foreign decree, judgment, or order may be recognized in the Philippines even if the parties in the case are not citizens of the issuing state, provided that the parties are persons who are under the protection of the laws of the foreign state. A divorce decree may be issued by a court that has jurisdiction over the place where the parties have their domicile, even though the parties are citizens or nationals of another state. The principle is particularly true when it comes to a divorce decree issued by a state belonging to the USA, where jurisdiction over the subject matter in actions for divorce depends upon domicile, and without such domicile there would be no authority to decree a divorce.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals ruled that Anido should have presented proof that under the laws of Peru, Enrique was allowed to remarry. However, by the wording of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, it is the divorce decree validly obtained abroad that must capacitate the alien spouse to remarry. The provision recognizes that even when a foreign court dissolves a marriage by way of divorce, it may prohibit remarriage based on the pertinent foreign statute. Consequently, in a petition for the recognition of a divorce decree, the petitioner must prove that the divorce decree itself or the applicable foreign law which granted the divorce allows remarriage.
Fifth, even if the citizenship of Enrique was a material matter in the divorce between the spouses, the Kentucky Court would have taken into account the laws of Peru in relation to Kentucky’s rules as to conflict of laws. It follows that the decision of the Kentucky Court to grant the divorce decree in issue would be based on its own appreciation and interpretation of Kentucky’s rules on conflict of laws and its marriage statutes. Consequently, to look at the national law of Enrique and to apply it to the subject divorce decree would be tantamount to a relitigation or review of the merits of the foreign divorce decree, which cannot be done by the Supreme Court in a petition for the recognition of a foreign judgment.
Certainly, in petitions for the recognition of a foreign judgment, as in the present case, the courts must adopt a policy of limited review and refrain from delving into the merits of the foreign judgment in question. The Philippine courts cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the alien who is a party to the foreign judgment; nor may they substitute their own interpretation of any provision of the law or rules of procedure of another country. Instead, the Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
In view of the foregoing, insofar as the recognition of the subject divorce decree is concerned, the Peruvian citizenship of Enrique and the governing marriage laws of Peru are immaterial. Considering that Kentucky was Enrique’s legal residence or domicile, and the subject divorce decree was issued by the Kentucky Court, it is ultimately the Kentucky laws that are determinative of the question of whether the divorce is effective in the country where it was rendered, and whether it must be recognized in the Philippines pursuant to the principle of comity. Otherwise said, to support her Petition for Enforcement and to prove that the divorce decree was validly obtained and capacitated Enrique to remarry, Anido need not prove the marriage laws of Peru; instead, she only needs to prove the pertinent laws of Kentucky as the state that issued the divorce decree.
The Supreme Court clarified that there are several cases, where it referred to the national law of the foreign spouse to determine whether a divorce decree was validly obtained under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court may make it appear that because Enrique was Peruvian, then it is the laws of Peru, as his national law, that must be proven to show that the divorce decree in issue was validly obtained and that he was capacitated to remarry thereafter.
The Supreme Court’s prior rulings must be taken in their proper context. In those cases where the Supreme Court looked at the national law of the alien spouse to determine whether the divorce was validly obtained, the decree or judgment of divorce originated from the same country in which the alien spouse was a citizen or a national. There was no variance between the citizenship or nationality of the alien spouse, on the one hand, and the country or state from which the divorce decree or judgment was issued, on the other.
In contrast, this case presents a peculiar situation where Enrique, a citizen of another country, i.e., Peru, obtained a divorce decree from another country in which he was domiciled, i.e., Kentucky, USA. The governing personal law of Enrique allowing him to dissolve his marriage to Anido could therefore be the marriage laws of Peru, his national law, or the marriage laws of Kentucky, his domicile law. As between the two, and in accordance with the principle of comity espoused in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, it is the marriage laws of Kentucky, USA, that must be proven by Anido, given that Enrique chose to institute the divorce proceedings in Kentucky and the divorce decree was issued by the Kentucky Court.
Nevertheless, despite ruling the foregoing, the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the reception of evidence on the marriage laws of Kentucky allowing Enrique to obtain the divorce decree in question and to remarry thereafter, as it was found that there was a failure to present competent proof of the foreign law concerning the divorce decree. While the absolute divorce decree was therefore already an established fact, there remained a question of whether the divorce decree was validly obtained under the personal law of Enrique, i.e., the marriage laws of Kentucky.
Thus, the personal law of the foreign spouse is deemed the law of the place where the divorce decree was obtained.
Ordinarily, Anido’s blunder or failure to establish the foreign law of the forum that issued the divorce decree should result in the dismissal of her Petition for lack of evidence, without prejudice to the refiling thereof, but the Supreme Court allowed the relaxation of the rules, by exception, in the higher interest of substantial justice considering (1) that Anido has provided a duly attested copy of the Divorce Certificate together with the certificate by a proper consular officer of the Philippines, in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court; (2) the fact that a decree of absolute divorce was rendered by the Kentucky Court is not in issue nor is it being assailed by the OSG; (3) that affirming the dismissal of the present case would require Anido to refile the same pleading and present anew her evidence on the divorce decree, which will only cause further delay and waste the resources not only of Anido but also of the courts; and (4) that with the divorce decree being established, justice dictates that Anido be given the opportunity to properly prove the appropriate foreign law so that she may be freed from a marriage where she is the only remaining party.